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Mixed-Effects Modeling and Non-Reductive Explanation 
(4975 words) 
Abstract: This essay considers a mixed-effects modeling practice and its 
implications for the philosophical debate surrounding reductive explanation. 
Mixed-effects modeling is a species of the multilevel modeling practice, where a 
single model incorporates simultaneously two (or even more) levels of 
explanatory variables to explain a phenomenon of interest. I argue that this 
practice makes the position of explanatory reductionism held by many 
philosophers untenable, because it violates two central tenets of explanatory 
reductionism: single level preference and lower-level obsession. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Explanatory reductionism is the position which holds that, given a relatively 
higher-level phenomenon (or state, event, process, etc.), it can be reductively 
explained by a relatively lower-level feature (Kaiser 2015, 97; see also Sarkar 
1998; Weber 2005; Rosenberg 2006; Waters 2008).1 Though philosophers tend to 
have slightly different conceptions of the position, two central tenets of the 
position can still be extracted:2  
 
                                                          
1 According to Sarkar (1998), explanatory reduction is an epistemological thesis 
which is distinguished from constitutive (ontological) and theory reductionism 
theses. Kaiser further distinguishes two sub-types of explanatory reduction: (a) “a 
relation between a higher-level explanation and a lower-level explanation of the 
same phenomenon” (2015, 97); (b) individual explanations, i.e., given a relatively 
higher-level phenomenon, it can be reductively explained by a relatively lower-
level feature (Ibid., 97). This essay will focus on the second sub-type. Besides, 
when referring to levels I mean either hierarchical organization such as 
universities, faculties, departments etc., or functional organization such as organs, 
tissues, cells etc. When referring to scales I mean spatial or temporal scaling 
where levels are not so clearly delimited. 
2 Similar summary of the position can be found in Sober (1999). 
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Single level preference: a phenomenon of interest can be fully explained by 
invoking features that reside at a single, well-defined level of analysis (e.g., 
molecular level in biology). 
 
Lower-level obsession: lower-level features always provide the most 
significant and detailed explanation of the phenomenon in question, so a 
lower-level explanation is always better than a higher-level explanation. 
 
Philosophers sometimes express these two tenets explicitly in their work. For 
example, Alex Rosenberg holds that “[…] there is a full and complete explanation 
of every biological fact, state, event, process, trend, or generalization, and that this 
explanation will cite only the interaction of macromolecules to provide this 
explanation” (Rosenberg 2006, 12). Marcel Weber expresses a similar idea in his 
explanatory hegemony thesis, according to which it’s always some lower-level 
physicochemical laws (or principles) that ultimately do the explanatory work in 
experimental biology (Weber 2005, 18-50). John Bickle attempts to motivate a 
‘ruthless’ reduction of psychological phenomena (e.g., memory) to the molecular 
level (Bickle 2003). 
However, many philosophers have questioned the plausibility of the position 
on the basis of scientific practice (Hull 1972; Craver 2007; Bechtel 2010; 
Brigandt 2010; Hüttemann and Love 2011; Kaiser 2015). To counter that position, 
some authors have pointed to the relevance of an important practice that has not 
received sufficient attention before: multiscale or multilevel modeling or 
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sometimes called integrative modeling approach, where a set of distinct models 
ranging over multiple levels or scales—including the macro-phenomenon 
level/scale—are involved in explaining a (often complex) phenomenon of interest 
(Mitchell 2003, 2009; Craver 2007; Brigandt 2010, 2013a, 2013b; Knuuttila 2011; 
Batterman 2013; Green 2013; O’ Malley et al. 2014; Green and Batterman 2017). 
Often these models work together by providing diverse constraints on the 
potential space of representation (Knuuttila and Loettgers 2010; Knuuttila 2011; 
Green 2013). 
This multilevel modeling surely casts some doubt on explanatory 
reductionism, for it seems unclear what reductively explains what—all those facts 
in the set of models ranging over different levels/scales are involved in doing 
some explanatory work. However, there is a species of multilevel modeling that 
has slipped away from most philosophers’ sights: mixed-effects modeling (MEM 
hereafter)—also called multilevel regression modeling, hierarchical linear 
modeling, etc.—in which a single model incorporating simultaneously two (or 
even more) levels of variables is used to explain a phenomenon. For a mixed-
effects model to explain, features of the so-called reducing and reduced levels 
must be simultaneously incorporated into the model, that is, they must go hand in 
hand.  
MEM deserves special attention because it sheds new light on the 
reductionism-antireductionism debate by showing that (a) a mixed-effects model 
violating the two central tenets of explanatory reductionism can provide 
successful explanation, and (b) a single mixed-effects model without integrating 
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with other epistemic means can also provide such successful explanation. 
Therefore, MEM first further challenges the explanatory reductionist position, and 
second offers a novel perspective bolstering the multilevel/multiscale integrative 
approach discussed by many philosophers. 
The essay proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the challenges faced by the 
traditional single-level modeling approach, and examines the reasons why the 
MEM approach is preferable in dealing with these challenges. Section 3 describes 
a MEM practice using a concrete model. Section 4 elaborates on the implications 
of MEM for the explanatory reductionism debate. Finally, Section 5 considers 
potential objections to my viewpoint. 
 
2. Challenges to Reductive Explanatory Strategies  
 
In many fields (e.g., biological, social and behavioral sciences) scientists find that 
the data collected show an intrinsically hierarchical or nested feature. Consider a 
simple example: we might be interested in examining relationships between 
students’ achievement at school (A hereafter) and the time they invest in studying 
(T).3 In conducting such a research, we might collect data from different classes 
(say 5 classes in total), with each class providing the same number of samples 
(say 10 students in each class). The data collected among classes might be taken 
for granted to be independent. Then we may use certain traditional statistical 
                                                          
3 For scientific studies of this kind, see Schagen (1990), Wang and Hsieh (2012), 
and Maxwell et al. (2017). 
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techniques such as ordinary least-squares (OLS) to analyze the data and build a 
linear relationship between A and T.  
However, this single-level reductive analysis can lead to misleading results, 
because it ignores the possibility that students within a class may be more similar 
to each other in important aspects than students from different classes. In other 
words, each group (class) may have its own features relevant to the relationship 
between A and T that the other groups lack. Hence, the data collected from the 
students are in fact not independent, i.e., the subjects are not randomly sampled, 
because the individuals (students) are clustered within groups (classes). In 
technical terms, we say our analysis may fall prey to the atomistic fallacy where 
we base our analysis solely on the individual level—i.e., we reduce all the group-
level features to the individuals. Therefore, traditional OLS techniques such as 
multiple regression cannot be employed in this context, because the case under 
consideration violates a fundamental assumption of these techniques: the 
independence of observations (Nezlek 2008, 843). 
Conversely, we may face the same problem the other way around if we fail to 
consider the inherently nested nature of the data. Consider the student-
achievement-at-school case again. We may observe that in classes where the time 
of study invested by students is very high, the achievements of the students are 
also very high. Given such an observation, we may reason that students who 
invest a lot of time in studying would be more likely to get higher achievements at 
school. However, this inference commits the ecological fallacy, because it 
attributes the relationship observed at the group-level to the individual-level 
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(Freedman 1999). The individuals may exhibit within-group differences that the 
single group-level analysis fails to capture. In technical terms, this inference flaws 
because it reduces the variability in achievement at the individual-level to a 
group-level variable, and the subsequent analysis is solely based on group’s mean 
achievement results (Heck and Thomas 2015, 3). Again, traditional statistical 
techniques such as multiple regression cannot be employed in this context. 
In sum, a single-level modeling approach that disrespects the multilevel data 
structure can commit either an atomistic or an ecological fallacy. Confronted with 
these problems, one response is to ‘tailor’ the traditional statistical techniques by, 
e.g., adding an effect variable to the model which indicates the grouping of the 
individuals. However, many have argued that this approach is unpromising 
because it may give rise to enormous new problems (Luke 2004; Nezlek 2008; 
Heck and Thomas 2015). Alternatively, scientists have developed a new 
framework that takes the multilevel data structure into full consideration, i.e., the 
MEM approach, to which we now turn. 
 
3. Case Study: A Mixed-Effects Model  
 
Depending on different conceptual and methodological roots we have two broad 
categories of MEM approaches: the multilevel regression approach and the 
structural equation modeling approach. The former usually focuses on direct 
effects of predictor variables on (typically) a single dependent variable, while the 
latter usually involves latent variables defined by observed indicators (for details 
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see Heck and Thomas 2015). For the purpose of this essay’s arguments, I will 
concentrate on the first kind. 
Consider the student-achievement-at-school example again. Since students are 
typically clustered in different classes, a student’s achievement at school may be 
both influenced by her own features (e.g., time invested in studying) and her 
class’s features (e.g., size of the class). Hence here comes two levels of analysis: 
the individual-level (level-1) and the group-level (level-2), and individuals (𝑖 =
1, 2, … ,𝑁) are clustered in level-2 groups (𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑛).4 Now suppose that 
students’ achievements at school are represented as scores they get in the exam. 
The effect of time invested in studying on scores can be described as follows: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                               (1) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗 refers to the score of individual 𝑖 in the 𝑗th group,  𝛽0𝑗 is a level-1 
intercept representing the mean of scores for the 𝑗th group, 𝛽1𝑗 a level-1 slope (i.e., 
different effects of study time on scores) for the predictor variable 𝑋𝑖𝑗, and the 
residual component (i.e., an error term) 𝜀𝑖𝑗 the deviation of individual 𝑖’s score 
from the level-2 mean in the 𝑗th group. Equation (1) looks like a multiple 
regression model; however, the subscript 𝑗 reveals that there is a group-level 
incorporated in the model. It can also be seen from this equation that both the 
                                                          
4 Note that, for instructive purposes, our case involves only two levels; however, 
the MEM approach can in principle be extended to many more levels. 
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intercept 𝛽0𝑗 and slope 𝛽1𝑗 can vary across the level-2 units, that is, different 
groups can have different intercepts and slopes.  
The most remarkable thing of MEM is that we treat both the intercept and 
slope at level-1 as dependent variables (i.e., outcomes) of level-2 predictor 
variables. So here we write the following equations expressing the relationships 
between the level-1 parameters and level-2 predictors: 
 
𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛾00 + 𝛾01𝑊𝑗 + 𝑢0𝑗                                                               (2) 
 
and 
 
𝛽1𝑗 = 𝛾10 + 𝛾11𝑊𝑗 + 𝑢1𝑗                                                                (3) 
 
where 𝛽0𝑗 refers to the level-1 intercept in level-2 unit 𝑗, 𝛾00 denotes the mean 
value of the level-1 intercept, controlling for the level-2 predictor 𝑊𝑗, 𝛾01 the 
slope for the level-2 variable 𝑊𝑗, and 𝑢0𝑗 the error (i.e., the random variability) 
for unit 𝑗. Also, 𝛽1𝑗 refers to the level-1 slope in level-2 unit 𝑗, 𝛾10 the mean value 
of the level-1 slope controlling for the level-2 predictor 𝑊𝑗, 𝛾11 the effect of the 
level-2 predictor 𝑊𝑗, and 𝑢1𝑗 the error for unit 𝑗.  
Equations (2) and (3) have specific meanings and purposes. They express how 
the level-1 parameters, i.e., intercept or slope, are functions of level-2 predictors 
and variability. They aim to explain variations in the randomly varying intercepts 
or slopes by adding one (or more) group-level predictor to the model. These 
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expressions are based on the idea that the group-level characteristics such as 
group size may impact the strength of the within-group effect of study time on 
scores. This kind of effect is called a cross-level interaction for it involves the 
impact of variables at one level of a data hierarchy on relationships at another 
level. We will discuss this in detail in the next section.  
Now we combine equations (1), (2) and (3) by substituting the level-2 parts of 
the model into the level-1 equation. We finally obtain the following equation: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = [𝛾00 + 𝛾10𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾01𝑊𝑗 + 𝛾11𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑊𝑗] + [𝑢1𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢0𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗]        (4) 
 
This equation can be simply understood that 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is made up of two components: 
the fixed-effect part expressed by the first four terms and the random-effect part 
expressed by the last three terms. Note that the term 𝛾11𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑊𝑗 denotes a cross-
level interaction between level-1 and level-2 variables, which is defined as the 
impact of a level-2 variable on the relationship between a level-1 predictor and 
the outcome 𝑌𝑖𝑗. We have 7 parameters to estimate in (4), they are four fixed 
effects: intercept, within-group predictor, between-group predictor and cross-level 
interaction, two random effects: the randomly varying intercept and slope, and a 
level-1 residual.  
Now a mixed-effects model has been built, and the next step is to estimate the 
parameters of the model. However, we will skip this step and turn to explore the 
philosophical implications of the modeling practice relevant to the explanatory 
reductionism debate. 
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4. Implications for the Explanatory Reductionism Debate  
 
Looking closely into the MEM practice, we find that a couple of important 
philosophical implications for the explanatory reductionism debate can be drawn. 
 
4.1. All levels are indispensable  
 
The first, and most obvious, feature of MEM is that it routinely involves many 
levels of analysis in a single model, and all these levels are indispensable to the 
model in the sense that no level can be reduced to or replaced by the other levels. 
These levels consist of both the so-called reducing level in the reductionist’s 
terminology, typically a lower-level that attempts to reduce another level, and the 
reduced level, typically a higher-level to be reduced by the reducing level. In our 
student-achievement-at-school case, for example, a reductionist may state that the 
group-level will be regarded as the reduced level whereas the student-level as the 
reducing level.  
The indispensability of each level in the model can be understood in two 
related ways. First, due to the nested nature of data, only when we incorporate 
different levels of analyses to the model can we avoid either the atomistic or 
ecological fallacy discussed in Section 2. As discussed in the student-
achievement-at-school example where students are clustered in different classes 
(in the manner that students from the same class may be more similar to each 
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other in important aspects than students from different classes), reducing all the 
analyses to the level of individual students can simply miss the important 
information associated with group-level features and thus lead to misleading 
results. Although it’s true that the problem might be partially mitigated by 
tailoring traditional single-level analytical techniques such as multiple regression, 
it’s also true that this somewhat ad hoc maneuver can simply bring about various 
new vexing and recalcitrant issues (Luke 2004; Nezlek 2008; Heck and Thomas 
2015). 
Second, the problem can also be viewed from the perspective of identifying 
explanatory variables. In building a mixed-effects model, the main consideration 
is often to find a couple of variables that may play the role of explaining the 
pattern or phenomenon observed in the data. Here a modeler must be clear about 
how to assign explanatory variables, for instance, she must consider if there are 
different levels of analyses and, if so, which explanatory variables should be 
assigned to what levels, and so on. These considerations may come before her 
model building because of background knowledge, which paves the way for her 
to develop a conceptual framework for investigating the problem of interest. 
However, without such a clear and rigorous consideration of identifying and 
assigning multilevel explanatory variables, an analysis can flaw simply because it 
confounds variables at different levels.  
Respecting the multilevel nature of explanatory variables has another 
advantage: “Through examining the variation in outcomes that exists at different 
levels of the data hierarchy, we can develop more refined theories about how 
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explanatory variables at each level contribute to variation in outcomes” (Heck and 
Thomas 2015, 33). In other words, in respecting the multilevel nature of 
explanatory variables, we get a clear idea of how, and to what degrees, 
explanatory variables at different levels contribute to variation in outcomes. If 
these variables do contribute to variation in outcomes, as it always happens in 
MEM, then the situation suggests an image of explanatory indispensability: all the 
explanatory variables at different levels are indispensable to explaining the pattern 
or phenomenon of interest. 
Given these considerations, therefore, one implication for the explanatory 
reductionism debate becomes clear: it isn’t always the case that, given a relatively 
higher-level phenomenon it can be reductively explained by a relatively lower-
level feature. Rather, in cases where the data show a nested structure or, put 
differently, the phenomenon suggests multilevel explanatory variables, we 
routinely combine the higher-level with the lower-level in a single (explanatory) 
model. As a result, one fundamental tenet of explanatory reductionism is violated: 
single level preference. 
 
4.2. Interactions between levels 
 
Another crucial feature of multilevel modeling is its emphasis on a cross-level 
interaction, which is defined as 
 
“The potential effects variables at one level of a data hierarchy have on 
relationships at another level […]. Hence, the presence of a cross-level 
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interaction implies that the magnitude of a relationship observed within 
groups is dependent on contextual or organizational features defined by 
higher-level units”. (Heck and Thomas 2015, 42-43) 
 
Remember that there is a term 𝛾11𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑊𝑗 in our mixed-effects model discussed in 
Section 3, which indicates the cross-level interaction between the group-level and 
the individual-level. More specifically, this term can be best construed as the 
impact of a group-level variable, e.g., group size, upon the individual-level 
relationship between a predictor, e.g., study time, and the outcome, e.g., students’ 
scores.  
The cross-level interaction points to the plain fact that an organization or a 
system can somehow influence its members or components by constraining how 
they behave within the organization or system. This doesn’t necessarily imply 
top-down causation (Section 5.3 will turn back to this point). Within the context 
of scientific explanation, however, it does imply that it isn’t simply that 
characteristics at different levels separately contribute to variation in outcomes, 
but rather that they interact in producing variation in outcomes. In other words, 
the pattern or phenomenon to be explained can be understood as generated by the 
interaction between explanatory variables at different levels. Therefore, to 
properly explain the phenomenon of interest, we need not only have a clear idea 
of how to assign explanatory variables to different levels but also an unequivocal 
conception of whether these explanatory variables may interact.  
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Different models can be built depending on different considerations of the 
cross-level interaction. To see this, consider the student-achievement-at-school 
example again. In some experiment setting we may assume that there was no 
cross-level interaction between group-level characteristics and the individual-
level relationship (between study time and scores). In such a situation, we kept the 
effect of individual study time on scores the same across different classes, i.e., we 
kept the slope constant across classes. In the meanwhile, we treated another 
group-level variable (i.e., intercept) as varying across classes, i.e., different 
classes have different average scores. So, this is a case where we have a clear idea 
of how to assign explanatory variables but no consideration of the cross-level 
interaction. Nonetheless, in a different experiment setting we may assume that 
there existed cross-level interaction, and hence the effect of individual study time 
on scores can no longer be kept constant across different classes. At the same time, 
we treated another group-level variable (i.e., intercept) as varying across classes. 
Hence, this is a case where we have both a clear idea of how to assign explanatory 
variables and a consideration of the cross-level interaction. Corresponding to 
these two different scenarios, two different mixed-effects models can be built, as 
shown below: 
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Figure 1. Two different models showing varying intercepts or varying 
intercepts and slopes, respectively. Three lines represent three classes. This 
figure is adapted from Luke (2004, 12). 
 
Given such a cross-level interaction, therefore, the explanatory reductionist 
position has been further challenged. This is because any reductive explanation 
that privileges one level of analysis—usually the lower-level—over the others 
falls short of capturing this kind of interaction between levels. If they fail to do so, 
then they are missing important terms relevant to explaining the phenomenon of 
interest. As a consequence, a mixed-effects model involving interactions between 
levels simultaneously violates the two fundamental pillars of explanatory 
reductionism: first, it violates single level preference because it involves 
multilevel explanatory variables in explaining phenomena, and second, it violates 
lower-level obsession because it privileges no levels—all levels are interactively 
engaged in producing outcomes.  
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5. Potential Objections  
 
This section considers two potential objections. 
 
5.1. In-principle argument 
 
One argument that resurfaces all the time in the reductionism-versus-
antireductionism debate is the in-principle argument, the core of which is that 
even if reductive explanations in a field of study are not available for the time 
being, it doesn’t follow that we won’t obtain them someday (e.g., Sober 1999; 
Rosenberg 2006). Therefore, according to some reductionists, the gap between 
current-science and future-science is simply a matter of time, for advancement in 
techniques, experimentation and data collecting can surely fill in the gap.  
However, I think the argument flaws. To begin with, advancement in 
techniques, experimentation and data collecting isn’t always followed by 
reductive explanations. For example, in our MEM discussed in Section 3, even if 
the data about the individual-level is available and sufficiently detailed, it isn’t the 
case that we explain the phenomenon of interest in terms of the data from the 
individual-level alone. Consider another example: in dealing with problems 
associated with complex systems in systems biology, even though large-scale 
experimentation (e.g., via computational simulation) can be conducted and high 
throughput data arranging over multiple scales/levels can be collected, a bottom-
up reductive approach must be integrated with a top-down perspective so as to 
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produce useful explanations or predictions (Green 2013; Green and Batterman 
2017; Gross and Green 2017).  
Nevertheless, reductionists may reply that the situations presented above only 
constitute an in-practice impediment, for it doesn’t undermine the possibility that 
lower-level reductive explanations, typically provided by some form of ‘final 
science’, will be available someday. Let us dwell on the notion of possibility a bit 
longer. The possibility here may be construed as a logical possibility (Green and 
Batterman 2017, 21; see also Batterman 2017). Nonetheless, if it’s merely 
logically possible that there will be some final science providing only reductive 
explanations, then nothing can exclude another logical possibility that there will 
be some ‘mixed-science’ providing only multilevel explanations. After all, how 
can we decide which logical possibility is more possible (or logically more 
possible)? I doubt that logic alone could provide anything useful in justifying 
which possibility is more possible, and that appealing to logical possibility could 
offer anything insightful in helping us understand how science proceeds. As 
Batterman puts, “Appeals to the possibility of in principle derivations rarely, if 
ever, come with even the slightest suggestion about how the derivations are 
supposed to go” (2017, 12; author’s emphasis).  
Another interpretation of possibility may be associated with real possibilities, 
referring to the actual cases of reductive explanations happening in science. 
Unfortunately, I don’t think the real scenario in science speaks for the reductionist 
under this interpretation. Though it’s impossible to calculate the absolute cases of 
non-reductive explanations occurring in science, a cursive look at scientific 
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practice can tell that a large portion of scientific explanations proceeds in a non-
reductive fashion, as suggested by multilevel modeling (Batterman 2013; Green 
2013; O’ Malley et al. 2014; Green and Batterman 2017; Mitchell and 
Gronenborn 2017). Moreover, even in areas such as physics which was regarded 
as a paradigm for the reductionist stance, progressive explanatory reduction 
doesn’t always happen (Green and Batterman 2017; Batterman 2017).  
In sum, we have shown that the in-principle argument fails for it neither offers 
help in understanding how science proceeds if it’s construed as implying a logical 
possibility, nor goes in tune with scientific practice if it’s construed as implying 
real possibilities. 
 
5.2. Top-down causation  
 
In Section 3 we have shown that there is a cross-level interaction taking the form 
that higher-level features may impact lower-level features. A worry arises: Does 
this imply top-down causation?  
My answer to this question is twofold. First, it’s clear that this short essay 
isn’t aimed to engage in the philosophical debate about whether, and in what 
sense, there exists top-down causation (see Craver and Bechtel 2007; Kaiser 2015; 
Bechtel 2017). Second, what we can do now is to show that the cross-level 
interaction is a clear and well-defined concept in multilevel modeling. It 
unambiguously means the constraints on the lower-level processes exerted by the 
higher-level parameters (Green and Batterman 2017). In our multilevel modeling 
20 
 
discussed in Section 3, we have shown that group-level features may impact some 
individual-level features through the way that each group possesses its own 
feature relevant to explaining the differences at the individual-level across groups. 
This idea is incorporated into the mixed-effects model by assigning some 
explanatory variables to the group-level and a cross-level interaction term to the 
model. 
The idea of cross-level-interaction-as-constraint is widely accepted in 
multilevel modeling broadly construed, where constraint is usually expressed in 
the form of initial and/or boundary conditions. For example, in modeling cardiac 
rhythms, due to “the influences of initial and boundary conditions on the solutions 
of the differential equations used to represent the lower level process” (Noble 
2012, 55; Cf. Green and Batterman 2017, 32), a model cannot simply narrowly 
focus on the level of proteins and DNA but must also consider the levels of cell 
and tissue working as constraints. The same story happens in cancer research, 
where scientists are advocating the idea that tumor development can be better 
understood if we consider the varying constraints exerted by tissue (Nelson and 
Bissel 2006; Shawky and Davidson 2015; Cf. Green and Batterman 2017, 32). 
 
6. conclusion 
 
This essay has shown that no-reductive explanations involving many levels 
predominate in areas where the systems under consideration exhibit a hierarchical 
structure. These explanations violate the fundamental pillars of explanatory 
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reductionism: single level preference and lower-level obsession. Traditional 
single-level reductive approaches fall short of capturing systems of this kind 
because they face the challenges of committing either the atomistic or ecological 
fallacy.  
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